On 5 November Microsoft published notice MC1540345: the Exchange Online Admin API v2.0 permissions are being renamed and the migration must be complete before 30 November. Today is the 16th: fourteen days left, ten of them working days not counting today. That is what the notice says. What it does not say is the rest of it: that API is where Microsoft is sending the administrative scenarios still running on EWS, it is still labelled Preview, and its own official manual —dated 25 September and untouched since— still tells you to grant exactly the permission that becomes deprecated on 1 December.
The change itself is small and fits in two lines. Exchange.ManageV2, the delegated permission, becomes Exchange.AdminAPI.Manage. Exchange.ManageAsAppV2, the application (no user) one, becomes Exchange.AdminAPI.ManageAsApp. The new ones have been available since 1 November worldwide; the old ones are deprecated on 1 December, and on 1 January 2027 for GCC, GCC High and DoD. The API itself is not being retired, nor are its endpoints or its version changing: the only thing that changes is which permission you use to ask for the token.
It is worth being precise about what happens on 1 December, because the notice does not leave it open. It says, verbatim: "Applications relying exclusively on the retired permissions after the applicable deprecation date will no longer be able to access the APIs". Retired permissions, and the consequence spelled out: an app that reaches that date with the old permission and nothing else stops getting in. The date is published and it is what it is, so there is no room to wait and see. What there is, is a way to do it without risk, because the part you can do today costs nothing and breaks nothing. We get to why below.
The first move is not to change anything: it is to look at which permission your apps hold
The notice names only the two permissions ending in V2. It does not name Exchange.ManageAsApp —without the V2— which is the one app-only Exchange Online PowerShell with a certificate has been using for years. If your automation is an unattended Connect-ExchangeOnline with a certificate thumbprint, the odds are this notice is not about you. Saying so costs us work, but it is the truth: a good part of the anxiety of the next two weeks will come from people who are not affected.
And here is the detail that turns "check it" from optional into mandatory. The API's official manual walks you, step by step and with screenshots, through ticking Exchange.ManageAsAppV2 in the app registration. In the very next step, the one where you verify the grant landed correctly, the same document tells you that you should see Exchange.ManageAsApp listed, without the V2. Those are two different permissions and only one of them is in the 5 November notice. This is not our reading: it is written that way on the Admin API authentication and authorisation page, consulted on 16 November 2026, whose own internal date is still 25 September.
One read-only pass that answers two migrations
The EWS permissions and the Admin API ones hang off the same resource application in Microsoft Entra: "Office 365 Exchange Online", identifier 00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000. Which means a single read-only query against that object answers both of the questions on your desk: who has to change permission before 30 November, and who has to get off EWS before it is switched off for good. We did not make this up: that same identifier is the one Microsoft points at for finding applications that use EWS.
1. Application permissions (no user): who has what granted
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "Application.Read.All","Directory.Read.All"
$exo = Get-MgServicePrincipal -Filter "appId eq '00000002-0000-0ff1-ce00-000000000000'" `
-Property "id,appId,displayName,appRoles" | Select-Object -First 1
$roles = @{}
$exo.AppRoles |
Where-Object { $_.Value -like 'Exchange.Manage*' -or
$_.Value -like 'Exchange.AdminAPI*' -or
$_.Value -eq 'full_access_as_app' } |
ForEach-Object { $roles[$_.Id] = $_.Value }
Get-MgServicePrincipalAppRoleAssignedTo -ServicePrincipalId $exo.Id -All |
Where-Object { $roles.ContainsKey($_.AppRoleId) } |
Select-Object PrincipalDisplayName,
@{n='Permiso';e={ $roles[$_.AppRoleId] }},
CreatedDateTime |
Sort-Object Permiso, PrincipalDisplayName
2. Delegated permissions: what has been consented on behalf of users
Get-MgOauth2PermissionGrant -All -Filter "resourceId eq '$($exo.Id)'" |
Where-Object { $_.Scope -match 'Exchange\.Manage|Exchange\.AdminAPI|EWS\.AccessAsUser' } |
Select-Object ClientId, ConsentType, PrincipalId, Scope
Both queries are read-only: they grant nothing, revoke nothing and consent to nothing. You need both, because the first covers application permissions and the second the delegated ones; if both come back empty, notice MC1540345 is not about you and you can close this tab with a clear conscience. One honest note on the first: the new permissions only show up in the tenant catalogue once they have reached your environment; they have been available worldwide since 1 November, but if you cannot see them yet, that is rollout, not your mistake.
| If the inventory returns… | What it means | Date |
|---|---|---|
Exchange.ManageAsAppV2 |
Unattended automation against the Admin API. You need to add Exchange.AdminAPI.ManageAsApp. |
30 Nov 2026 |
Exchange.ManageV2 |
App acting on behalf of an administrator. You need to add Exchange.AdminAPI.Manage. |
30 Nov 2026 |
full_access_as_app |
App-only EWS: access to every mailbox. A different migration, a different deadline, far more work. | 1 Apr 2027 |
EWS.AccessAsUser.All |
Delegated EWS. Same destination: out before the lights go off. | 1 Apr 2027 |
Exchange.ManageAsApp |
App-only PowerShell with a certificate. Not in the 5 November notice. | — |
We wrote about the EWS row a few days ago from another angle: when the retirement started to bite, what went dark was what your Microsoft 365 backup had stopped seeing. The reading here is the opposite and less comfortable: it is not only that things stop working, it is that the place you are sending them to is still being built.
The order works in your favour: this is additive, not a flag day
The word "deadline" suggests a cut-over night with everyone awake, and there isn't one here. The Admin API token is requested with the scope https://outlook.office365.com/.default, and the documentation, describing the app-only flow, spells out what that suffix does: "This value informs the Microsoft identity platform endpoint to include all app-level permissions the admin consented to in the access token". All permissions consented for that resource. Meaning: an app that holds both the old and the new one gets both in the same token.
Which is why the correct order is the boring one: add the new permission, consent to it, test that the integration still works, and only then remove the old one. At no point is the app left without a valid permission, and if something goes wrong the old one is still there until 1 December. What you cannot do is the reverse —remove first— or leave it until the afternoon of the 30th, because admin consent in a serious company goes through a committee or, at the very least, through somebody who has to approve it and is on holiday today.
And if the integration is still broken after you add the permission, the error code tells you where to look without losing the afternoon. 401 is a token problem: it is missing, expired, or carries the wrong scope. 403 is something else entirely, and the documentation says so plainly: "Without the appropriate RBAC role assignments, even valid tokens fail with the error: 403 Forbidden". A perfect token and a missing Exchange role. In the delegated flow the role belongs to the user; in app-only, to the application's service principal. The /OrganizationConfig and /AcceptedDomain endpoints want "View-Only Organization Management"; /Mailbox, /MailboxFolderPermission and the distribution group member ones want "Recipient Management". Adding an Entra permission grants you none of those roles.
The uncomfortable part: the destination of your EWS exit is moving
Put the two things side by side. The EWS retirement announcement, published in February and updated on 27 October, laid out the calendar: phased disablement from 1 October 2026, a window in which an admin can still re-enable it until 31 March 2027, and final shutdown on 1 April 2027. That is 135 days from today —the arithmetic is ours—. That announcement recommends exactly one thing, Microsoft Graph, and states that "Microsoft Graph has reached near-complete feature parity for the vast majority of EWS scenarios". It does not mention the Admin API once.
The Admin API documentation, on the other hand, introduces itself like this: "The Exchange Online Admin API provides a REST-based way to execute specific PowerShell cmdlets, replacing legacy Exchange Web Services (EWS) scenarios". Both sentences are Microsoft's and both are true, because they describe different halves of the problem. What goes to Graph is mailbox data access: reading mail, calendars, contacts. What goes to the Admin API is whatever is shaped like a cmdlet rather than like data: Get-Mailbox, folder permissions, group members, organisation configuration. Your EWS exit does not have one destination. It has two.
And the two halves are not equally solid. The Graph one has been around for years and the vendor itself labels it near-complete parity. The other one carries this warning at the top of its own manual: "The features described in this article are currently in Preview, aren't available in all organizations, and are subject to change". Preview, not available in all organisations, subject to change. Less than two months have passed between the date of its public documentation —25 September— and today, and in that time it has already changed its permission model with a thirty-day window. This is not a cheap shot: it is exactly what the label says, and it is information that changes how you plan.
Our reading: this is not a reason to stop, it is a reason to sequence. Whatever can move to Graph, move it now; the floor does not shift there and the 1 April deadline is real. Whatever depends on the Admin API, do the free part today —the new permission, added and tested— and do not commit to a date for rewriting the rest while the Preview label is still on. Committing a migration date against an interface that warns it may change is the kind of decision somebody else pays for later in overtime.
When none of this is about you
If the two queries above come back with zero rows, that is that: close the notice. If the only thing that shows up is Exchange.ManageAsApp without the V2, same. And if the app that appears is not yours but a vendor's —a backup tool, a reporting tool, a mailbox migration tool— the permission is declared by that vendor's app registration and your part will be re-granting consent when they publish it. The useful move there is not touching Entra: it is writing them one line today asking whether they have migrated already, and keeping the answer. We do it with ours, and not out of distrust: to have somebody else's date in hand before we need it.
What is not optional for anyone is the question underneath, which is not about permissions. An application registered in your tenant with an organisation-wide permission is a production system: it authenticates on its own, in the small hours, against your mailboxes, and when it stops working nobody notices until a report or a backup is missing. We treat our own internal automation that way —the self-hosted n8n that publishes and shuffles tasks— exactly like a server: inventoried, with an owner and an update window. The app registrations we find when we walk into somebody else's tenant rarely have all three. We wrote about the price of that ownerless account when someone signed in as an application and Entra ID asked for no MFA: an application identity never gets tired, never forgets its password and never goes through the second factor.
So the 30 November deadline, looked at closely, is a cheap excuse to do work that needed doing anyway: putting a name and an owner on every non-human identity that reaches your mail. If the inventory comes back empty, you have lost ten minutes. If it comes back full, you have just found out how many things in your company depend on a permission nobody remembers granting. For the tenant governance half —identities, consents, policies— that conversation is managed Microsoft 365; for the "who looks at this and when" half, which is the one that actually fails, it is IT maintenance. If you want us to run the inventory with you and tell you plainly whether it affects you or not, get in touch.
Sources (verified on 16 November 2026): notice MC1540345 "Action required: Update permissions for Exchange Online Admin API", published 5 November 2026, with both permission replacements, availability from 1 November, the 30 November deadline and deprecation on 1 December (1 January 2027 for GCC, GCC High and DoD), on the public Message Center mirror. That the API itself is not being retired and only the permissions change, plus the sentence about authentication failures, from Petri (9 November 2026). The permission names the manual tells you to grant, the inconsistency between the selection step and the verification step, the Preview warning, the /.default scope and what it puts in the token, the 401 versus 403 distinction and the endpoint-to-role-group table, from the Admin API authentication and authorisation and get started pages, both carrying an internal date of 25 September 2026. The EWS calendar (phases from 1 October 2026, admin-controllable window until 31 March 2027, shutdown on 1 April 2027) and the Graph parity quote, from the EWS retirement announcement. The "Office 365 Exchange Online" identifier and the EWS permission names, from Microsoft's guide to identifying applications that use EWS. Ours are the fourteen calendar days and ten working days (not counting today) to 30 November and the 135 days to 1 April 2027. Both PowerShell queries are ours, read-only, and written for the Microsoft.Graph module.
Who owns the application that reaches your mail?
If the answer takes more than a minute, the problem is not the permission expiring on 30 November. We will run the identity inventory of your tenant with you and tell you plainly what affects you and what does not.
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